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TENDER OFFERS: STANDING TO SUE, PROHIBITED
PRACTICES, RELIANCE OF NON-TENDERER
Congress passed the Williams Act1 in 1968 to control and regulate the
growing use of tender offers 2 as a means of gaining corporate control.
3
I Williams Act, adding Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) [hereinafter cited as Williams Act].
2 Congress did not define "tender offer" in the Williams Act. See M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AN FRRaazouTs § 2.3.1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LIPTON &
STEINBERGER]. Until recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also declined
to define "tender offer." See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676 (Aug. 2,
1976) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) % 80,659 at 86,695-96; E. ARA-
NOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CON-
TROL 1-3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ARANow, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN]. On November 29,
1979, however, the SEC published Proposed Rule 14d-1 to amend 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1979) by
providing a concrete definition of a tender offer. See Note, What is a Tender Offer? 37
WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 908 (1980).
The flexibility of the tender offer as a means to gain corporate control helps explain the
tender offer's popularity. A tender offer is available to acquire a company that opposes ac-
quisition, to effect an acquisiton that is not opposed but which a majority of the board of
directors does not want to sponsor, to acquire control of a target before a third party can
perfect a competing offer, and to rescue a company in trouble when'insufficient time exists
for a merger. See LIPTON & STEMsERGER, supra § 1.1.1.
3 Prior to the adoption of the Williams Act, little regulation governed the mechanics
and techniques used in executing a tender offer. See Pitt, Standing To Sue Under the Wil-
liams Act After Chris-Craft; A Leaking Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117, 125
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Pitt]. The relatively few state laws governing tender offers were
ineffective, and virtually no federal securities law covered this method of gaining corporate
control. Id. Congress passed the Williams Act to alleviate the inadequacy in the federal
regulatory scheme. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
The need to correct the inadequacy in the federal securities laws was highlighted during
the 1960's by the dramatic increase in the use of tender offers as a means of facilitating a
corporate takeover. See id. at 22; E. AaANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 64-65 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANoW & EINHORN]; Note, 1977-1978 Securities
Law Developments: Tender Offers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 893 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Tender Offers]. Tender offers involving companies listed on national securities ex-
changes jumped from 8 in 1960 to 107 in 1966. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra at 65 n.3. The
eight tender offers in 1960 were for $200 million of listed securities. Id. This figure rose to
approximately $1 billion in 1965. Id. see 113 CONG. REc. 24662-64 (1967).
Federal regulation of tender offers originally was proposed in 1965 by Senator Harrison
Williams of New Jersey. ARNow & EINHORN, supra at 64. The original bill sought to protect
established companies from "industrial sabotage" resulting from tender offers. Id.; see 111
CONG. REc. 28256-60 (1965). Hearings were not held on the original bill but many of the
bill's precepts formed the basis for a second bill introduced by Senator Williams in 1967.
ARANow & EINHORN, supra at 66. By 1966, however, Congress recognized that tender offers
are beneficial in appropriate circumstances because they provide a method of removing en-
trenched but ineffective management. Id.; see Pitt supra at 127. Hence, the final form of the
Williams Act, effective on July 29, 1968, was neutral in that the Act favored neither the
tender offeror nor the management of the target company. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra at 67;
see H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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The Williams Act seeks to provide full and fair-disclosure of all pertinent
information 4 to the investor faced with a tender offer.5 The Act insures
full and fair disclosure by requiring the filing of a statement by a tender
offeror with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) when the
tender offer is made.6 Within ten days after acquiring beneficial owner-
ship7 of five percent of any class of a target company's registered equity
securities, a tender offeror must file an additional statement with the
SEC, the target corporation, and any exchange on which the target's se-
curities are traded." Further, the Williams Act broadly proscribes mate-
rial misstatements, misleading omissions, and fraudulent or manipulative
acts in connection with tender offers.9
Although Congress did not provide explicitly for private enforcement
of the Williams Act, courts have not hesitated to imply private causes of
action. 10 In implying private causes of action, however, the courts have
had difficulty defining the standing requirements for private plaintiffs.11
Furthermore, the broad anti-fraud provision12 has created confusion as to
NEws 2811, 2813. Thus, the Williams Act requires full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
investors while, at the same time, providing the offeror and the target's management an
equal opportunity to present their cases.
4 See text accompanying notes 7-8 infra.
5 See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2811, 2813; note 3 supra.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. II 1978). The tender offeror must file a disclosure state-
ment, Schedule 14D-1, when the offeror would own more than five percent of a class of a
target corporation's registered securities as a result of the tender offer. See id.; 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-100 (1979). Schedule 14D-1 must contain information regarding the identity and
background of the tender offeror, the source of funds for the tender offer, and any plans or
proposals for mergers, acquisitions, or other major changes in the target company's corpo-
rate structure. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). Section 78n also delineates withdrawal rights
with respect to tendered shares, id. § 78n(d)(5), requirements as to pro rata acceptance
when more shares are tendered than sought, id. § 78n(d)(6), and obligations of the offeror
when changes are made in the terms of the offer. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
7 The beneficial owner of a security is any person who directly or indirectly has the
voting power and/or the investment power of that security. SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 34-13291 (Feb. 24, 1977) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1 80,980 at 87,577. Voting power includes the power to vote or direct the voting of the
security. Id. Investment power includes the power to dispose or direct the disposition of the
security. Id.
* 15 U.S.C. § 78rn(d)(1) (Supp. II 1978). The statement which the tender offeror must
file after acquiring the beneficial ownership of five percent of any class of the target com-
pany's registered equity securities is a Schedule 13D. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1979).
Schedules 13D and 14D-1, see note 6 supra, contain basically the same information. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). See also Tender Offers, supra note 3, at
894.
o 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); see note 15 infra.
10 See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 769 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 n.20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Re-
serve Management Corp. v. Anchor Daily Income Fund, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 597, 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
11 See text accompanying notes 15-69 infra.
12 See text accompanying note 9 supra; note 15 infra.
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when and to what practices the Williams Act applies."3 Finally, the courts
have had to decide whether a non-tendering shareholder must establish
reliance to recover damages under the Williams Act.14
A. Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act
Section 14(e) 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) is the
broad anti-fraud provision that provides the basis for most of the private
litigation instituted under the Williams Act.' Since section 14(e) does not
provide expressly for a private cause of action, 17 the courts have had to
define the standing requirements for a plaintiff in a private suit brought
for alleged tender offer violations. 8 In Hundahl v. United Benefit Life
Insurance Co.,1 9 the court held that a non-tendering shareholder of the
target corporation has standing to bring suit based on a violation of sec-
tion 14(e).2 0
Hundahl involved a tender offer by Mutual of Omaha Insurance Com-
pany (Mutual) for 8.51 percent of the stock of United Benefit Life Insur-
ance Company (United).2 1 Plaintiffs, shareholders of United,22 sued under
section 14(e) 23 two days before the expiration of Mutual's tender offer
:s See text accompanying notes 70-174 infra.
24 See text accompanying notes 175-97 infra.
1 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made.. .not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipula-
tive acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation
for tenders....
18 Rule 10b-5 is the broad anti-fraud provision that prevents misleading statements,
material omissions, and fraudulent or manipulative practices in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Section 14(e) contains the
same basic language as Rule 10b-5 and thus, in effect, applies Rule 10b-5 to tender offers.
See Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 1978); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1974); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1969); Applied Digital Data Systems Inc. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hurwitz v. R.B. Jones Corp., 76 F.R.D. 149,
161 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
17 See note 15 supra.
18 See text accompanying notes 15-69 infra.
9' 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
20 Id. at 1368. See also In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litiga-
tion, 467 F. Supp. 227, 242 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (non-tendering shareholder of target corpora-
tion has standing to sue for alleged violation of § 14(e)); text accompanying notes 155-74
infra.
21 465 F. Supp. at 1353.
22 The plaintiffs in Hundahl, with respect to the § 14(e) claim, sued individually as
shareholders of United Benefit Life Insurance Company (United) and as representatives of
a class composed of all current minority shareholders of United. See id.
23 The plaintiffs in Hundahl also alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5. See id. at 1356-66.
Because of the similarity between § 14(e) and Rule 10b-5, see note 16 supra, suits brought
for fraudulent and deceptive conduct in connection with a tender offer may contain claims
based on violations of both provisions.
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and sought injunctive and monetary relief.2" Plaintiffs had not tendered
any of their United shares in response to Mutual's offer.2 5 The Hundahl
court thus faced the question of whether an implied cause of action exists
under section 14(e) in favor of a non-tendering shareholder of the target
corporation.
2 6
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,27 the seminal case involving
standing to sue under section 14(e), the Supreme Court held that a de-
feated tender offeror lacked standing under section 14(e). 28 An examina-
tion of the legislative history of section 14(e) led the Court to conclude
that Congress enacted the Williams Act solely for the protection of inves-
tors confronted with a tender offer and not for defeated tender offerors
such as Chris-Craft.2 9 The Court reasoned that implying a private cause
of action in favor of a defeated tender offeror would not further the con-
gressional goal of protecting the investor.30 Moreover, since Chris-Craft's
claim was cognizable under state law, no need existed for creating a fed-
eral cause of action.
3 1
The Hundahl court adopted the Chris-Craft analysis to determine
whether section 14(e) creates a private cause of action for a target com-
pany's shareholder.32 After examining the legislative history of section
" 465 F. Supp. at 1353.
25 Id. at 1366.
26 Id.
27 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. (Chris-Craft) sought to gain voting
control of Piper Aircraft Corp. (Piper) through a series of cash and exchange tender offers.
Id. at 5-7. Piper's management opposed the tender offer and arranged to work with Bangor
Punta Corporation (Bangor Punta) to prevent the takeover by Chris-Craft. Id. at 6-7. The
combined efforts of Piper and Bangor Punta prevented Chris-Craft's takeover bid. Id. at 9.
Chris-Craft sued alleging material misstatements and omissions during the tender offer
amounting to a violation of § 14(e). Id. at 17.
" Id. at 42. The Supreme Court denied Chris-Craft standing to bring suit as a defeated
tender offeror despite the fact that Chris-Craft was also a shareholder of Piper, the target
corporation.
" Id. at 26-35. Whether a federal statute creates a private cause of action for a particu-
lar plaintiff depends on whether Congress intended to create the private right asserted. See
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 14 (1979); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
30 430 U.S. at 39-40. The court in Chris-Craft stated that a damage award to a defeated
tender offeror would not benefit the target corporation's shareholders, the intended benefi-
ciaries of the Williams Act, but would benefit one of the parties regulated by the legislation.
Id. at 39. Further, the threat of damages against a successful contestant in a battle for
corporate control would not protect investors to a significant degree. Id. at 39-40. In fact,
tender offerors might not make some tender offers, to the detriment of investors, if the
successful tender offeror faces a suit for massive damages brought by a defeated tender
offeror. Id. at 40; cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-85 (1975) (statement of tests used by
Chris-Craft Court to determine whether to imply private cause of action).
31 430 U.S. at 40-41. Chris-Craft's complaint stated a cause of action under common law
principles for interference with a prospective commercial advantage, a cause of action tradi-
tionally brought under state law. Id.
2 See 465 F. Supp. at 1366-70. The Chris-Craft Court specifically left open the ques-
tion of whether § 14(e) creates a private cause of a~tion for a target company's shareholder.
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14(e), the Hundahl court concluded that Congress enacted section 14(e)
solely for the protection of shareholders of the target corporation."3
Therefore, any monetary award resulting from such an action would ben-
efit those protected by the statute.3 4 In addition, section 14(e) contains
the same basic language as Rule 10b-5,3 5 and Congress, in enacting sec-
tion 14(e), knew that courts often had implied private causes of action
under Rule 10b-5.36 Finally, the Hundahl court stated that the creation of
a private damages remedy was necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
Williams Act because the SEC is not involved in the early stages of take-
over activity and injunctive relief is often impracticable.3 7
Hundahl further extended the implied cause of action under section
14(e) to non-tendering shareholders of a target corporation."8 The court
emphasized that section 14(e), unlike Rule 10b-5," applies whether or not
the plaintiff has purchased or sold securities.40 The omission of a pur-
chaser-seller requirement in section 14(e), according to the Hundahl
court, indicates a congressional intent not to require a tendering of shares
before a shareholder of the target corporation can take advantage of sec-
See 430 U.S. at 42 n.28.
" 465 F. Supp. at 1367; see 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (legislation will close significant
gap in investor protection under federal securities laws by requiring disclosure of pertinent
information to stockholders); 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (Williams Act is designed solely
to require full and fair disclosure for benefit of investors). The Hundahl court also noted
that Congress enacted the Williams Act to avoid aiding either the target corporation's man-
agement or the tender offeror in a takeover bid. 465 F. Supp. at 1367. Chris-Craft held that
this purpose of the Williams Act prevented implying a cause of action in favor of a tender
offeror because implication of a private right would disrupt the "evenhandedness" created
by the Act. 430 U.S. at 31. Hundahl held that implying a cause of action in favor of a target
shareholder would not upset the Williams Act's evenhandedness because the shareholder of
the target corporation is the express beneficiary of the statute. 465 F. Supp. at 1367.
3, 465 F. Supp. at 1367. The Chris-Craft Court, in holding that § 14(e) does not create
a private cause of action in favor of a defeated tender offeror, stated that any award of
damages to a defeated tender offeror would not benefit the investors who are the intended
beneficiaries of § 14(e). See 430 U.S. at 39; note 30 supra. The Hundahl court interpreted
this statement in Chris-Craft to imply that an award of damages benefiting the intended
beneficiary of § 14(e) is acceptable. See 465 F. Supp. at 1367.
3' See note 16 supra.
31 465 F. Supp. at 1367.
37 Id.; see Pitt, supra note 3, at 163-66. The lower courts uniformly hold that an im-
plied cause of action in favor of shareholders of the target company exists under § 14(e).
See, e.g., Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 578 F.2d 180, 183 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978);
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 769 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 596 (6th Cir. 1974); Reserve Management Corp. v. Anchor Daily Income Fund,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 597, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
465 F. Supp. at 1367.
39 See note 16 supra.
40 435 F. Supp. at 1368 (quoting Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596
(5th Cir. 1974)). Rule 10b-5 prohibits manipulation and deception in the purchase and sale
of securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979); note 16 supra. Courts construe this pur-
chaser-seller requirement to mean that a plaintiff must be a purchaser and seller of securi-
ties in order to have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor




The Hundahl decision to imply a section 14(e) cause of action in favor
of a non-tendering shareholder is correct. All of the target company's
shareholders must decide whether to accept a tender offer. The legislative
history of the entire Williams Act indicates that Congress intended the
benefits of the Act to accrue to shareholders of the target corporation.
42
No distinction is made between tendering and non-tendering sharehold-
ers. In fact, the absence of a purchaser-seller requirement in section 14(e)
clearly indicates that Congress specifically contemplated the protection of
the non-tendering shareholder.43 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inti-
mated support for the Hundahl decision to extend standing under section
14(e) to a non-tendering target shareholder.
44
Like the court in Hundahl, the Second Circuit, in Crane Co. v. Ameri-
can Standard, Inc.,45 decided whether a plaintiff has standing in a suit
based on alleged deception and misstatements during a tender offer. Spe-
cifically, the Crane court decided whether a tender offeror has standing to
sue under section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5 to redress allegedly
fraudulent practices occurring during a tender offer.
Crane Company (Crane) and American Standard, Inc., (Standard)
were waging a takeover battle for control of Westinghouse Air Brake
Company (Air Brake).4" When Crane began purchasing Air Brake stock in
1967, Air Brake informed Crane of Air Brake's opposition to a merger
4 435 F. Supp. at 1368. The Supreme Court construes strictly the purchaser-seller re-
quirement of Rule 10b-5. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731,
749 (1975). The Court stated that absent such a strict construction, courts would face a
boundless class of non-purchasing or non-selling plaintiffs who would seek some type of
relief for a Rule 10b-5 violation. Id. at 740. Hundahl correctly found that this concern is not
present as to non-tendering shareholders under § 14(e) because the class of potential plain-
tiffs is limited to non-tendering holders of target company stock. See 465 F. Supp. at 1368.
" See note 33 supra.
4" See 2 BROMBERG & Lowa NmLs, SEcuamms FRAUD AN COMMODrrmEs FRAUD § 6.3
(1979) (Congress showed as much concern for non-tendering as for tendering shareholder by
eliminating Rule 10b-5's purchase or sale requirement).
" See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 38 (omission of purchaser-seller
requirement may evidence congressional desire to protect shareholder-offerees who decide
not to tender stock). The lower courts are in virtual agreement that a private cause of action
exists under § 14(e) in favor of a non-tendering target shareholder. See, e.g., Smallwood v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir. 1974); Electronic Specialty Co. v. Interna-
tional Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969); Hurwitz v. R.B. Jones Corp., 76
F.R.D. 149, 161 (W.D. Mo. 1977); McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1282
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp. 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But
see Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,591 at 98,703 (N.E. l. 1969) (if court does not restrict standing, non-tenderor
could, subsequent to tender offer, file claim for damages resulting from his decision not to
tender rather than from misdeeds of the defendant). See generally, ARANOW, EINHORN, &
BERLSTEmiN, supra note 2, at 115; Pitt, supra note 3, at 189-90; Note, Standing to Sue Under
Section 14(e), 26 KAN. L. Rv. 624, 636 (1978).
45 603 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1979).
46 Id. at 245.
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with Crane.47 After Crane continued making open market purchases of
Air Brake stock, Air Brake raised the cumulative vote necessary to obtain
representation on its board of directors.4 Air Brake's directors also ap-
proved a merger of Air Brake into Standard to fend off Crane's takeover
attempt.49 Crane countered with an exchange offer of subordinated de-
bentures for each share of Air Brake stock. 0 This tender offer, coupled
with open market purchases, resulted in Crane owning 32.2 percent of Air
Brake's outstanding stock on May 24, 1968.51 The Air Brake stockholders,
however, already had approved the merger of Air Brake into Standard at
a May 16 stockholders' meeting.
52
Crane ified suit under section 10(b)5" and Rule 10b-5" alleging mis-
representations in Air Brake's proxy statement soliciting votes for the
proposed merger, and fraud and market manipulation by Standard.5 5 The
Second Circuit, relying on Chris-Craft, which held that a tender offeror
lacked standing under section 14(e) for alleged tender offer irregulari-
ties,56 decided that a tender offeror lacks standing under Rule 10b-5 for
alleged fraud in connection with a tender offer.
57
47 Id.
48 Id. A reluctant target company often increases the cumulative vote necessary to ob-
tain representation on its board of directors as a defensive tactic to frustrate the takeover
attempt. See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 6.2.2.
49 603 F.2d at 246. Prior to the approval of a merger of Air Brake into Standard, Crane
filed statements with the SEC declaring an intention to solicit proxies for the election of Air
Brake directors. Id. at 245-46.
50 Id. at 246. Crane's exchange offer originally was open from April 10, 1968, through
April 19, 1968. On April 19, Standard purchased a large block of Air Brake stock on the
open market, thereby making the market activity with respect to Air Brake stock appar-
ently increase. At the same time, Standard made two undisclosed, off-the-market sales of
the same stock. Id. Crane alleged that this buying and selling of Air Brake stock by Stan-
dard violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.; see text accompanying note 55 infra. Crane ex-
tended its tender offer several times so that the final expiration date was May 24, 1968. 603
F.2d at 246.
51 Id.
52 Id. The merger of Air Brake into Standard became effective on June 7, 1968. As a
result of the merger, Crane owned 740,211 shares of Standard convertible preferred stock.
Under threat of an antitrust suit by Standard, a competitor of Crane's in the plumbing
industry, Crane sold all but 10,000 of these shares. See id.
53 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979); see note 16 supra.
55 603 F.2d at 246. In addition to claiming violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-6, Crane
alleged violations of § 9 and § 14 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78n (1976); Rule 10b-6, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1979); and Regulation 14a, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 et seq. (1979).
" See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
57 603 F.2d at 249. The district court dismissed Crane's original complaint because of
lack of standing. Id. at 247. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part, holding that
Crane had standing to sue under §§ 9 & 10 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1976). See
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir. 1969). The Second
Circuit also held that Standard violated § 9 (a)(2) (one may not buy or sell a listed security
to create artificial market activity), § 10(b), and Rule lOb-5. Id. at 795-98. Standard violated
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose the manipulation of Air Brake stock. Id.; see
note 50 supra. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a determina-
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The Crane court first noted that the language of Rule 10b-5 and sec-
tion 14(e) is substantially identical .5  Because section 14(e), however,
deals specifically with tender offers, section 14(e) is the more appropriate
basis for a defeated tender offeror's suit.59 Since the Supreme Court held
in Chris-Craft that a tender offeror's suit under section 14(e) is inappro-
priate, the Crane court was not willing to imply a cause of action for a
defeated tender offeror under the more general provisions of Rule 10b-5."
The Crane court examined the legislative history of section 10(b)6 '
and concluded that section 10(b), like section 14(e),62 was enacted to pro-
tect investors and not tender offerors.6 3 Crane thus limited the right to
bring a cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to defrauded
investors." As an investor, Crane made a profit of approximately $10 mil-
lion by selling the Standard shares received in the merger.6 5 Therefore,
Crane was not a defrauded investor and thus could sue only as a defeated
tender offeror by claiming that Standard's actions illegally prevented
Crane from acquiring control of Air Brake. The court held that Crane,
suing as a defeated tender offeror, was not an intended beneficiary of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and had no standing to bring suit.66
The court also enumerated certain policy considerations supporting
the denial of standing to Crane. First, the threat of a damage suit by a
tion of damages. 419 F.2d at 803.
Before the district court rendered a decision, the Supreme Court decided Chris-Craft.
See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra. The district court then reconsidered whether
Crane, as a tender offeror, had standing to bring suit under Rule 10b-5 and held that Chris-
Craft precluded such standing. See Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 945,
951 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Second Circuit affirmed the post-Chris-Craft denial of standing.
See 603 F.2d at 249-51.
Crane argued that the district court, in denying standing on remand, violated the "law
of the case" doctrine. See id. at 248. The Second Circuit held that regardless of the propri-
ety of the district court's decision, the Second Circuit was not bound by the previous deci-
sion. Id. Recognizing that the law of the case doctrine is not rigid, the court reconsidered
the threshold question of standing since a denial of standing would avoid further proceed-
ings on the merits and thus conserve judicial resources. Id. Such concern is ironic given that
the Crane case was in litigation for 11 years.
" Id. at 249.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Section 10(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), gives the SEC rulemaking
authority with respect to fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. The
SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to this authority. See 603 F.2d at 249 n.11. There-
fore, the scope of Rule 10b-5 and the authority to bring an action based on Rule 10b-5
violations cannot exceed the authority allowed under § 10(b). See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1975).
"' See text accompanying note 29 supra.
63 603 F.2d at 250; see 78 CoNG. REc. 2271 (1934) (section 10(b) forbids devices detri-
mental to proper protection of investors). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 198 (1976) (overall purpose of '33 and '34 Acts is to protect investors).
603 F.2d at 250.
63 Id.; see note 52 supra.
603 F.2d at 250-51.
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defeated tender offeror would provide little additional protection for in-
vestors.8 7 Second, injunctive relief at an earlier stage of the proceeding is
a more efficient remedy for illegal conduct than a damages suit which
only provides retrospective relief.8 Third, the former stockholders of Air
Brake who allegedly were misled by Standard's actions were now, because
of the merger, stockholders of Standard. Any liability imposed on Stan-
dard ultimately would fall on these shareholders. The Second Circuit rea-
soned that an anomalous situation would result if former stockholders of
Air Brake, who allegedly were misled by Standard's actions, had to bear
the cost of satisfying the damages allegedly suffered by Crane.69
In light of Chris-Craft, the Crane decision denying a defeated tender
offeror standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 is sound. Section 14(e) of the '34
Act prohibits fraud in connection with tender offers. Chris-Craft, how-
ever, precludes a tender offeror from suing under section 14(e). Therefore,
tender offerors should not be able to sue under the much broader provi-
sions of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Though Crane is the first decision
after Chris-Craft to consider the standing of a defeated tender offeror
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Crane decision should provide
strong precedential value. Adoption of the Crane rationale will effectuate
the legislative intent behind section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 while not af-
fecting the rights of the investors who must decide whether or not to
tender their shares. Thus, Crane and Hundahl both insure that the cor-
porate investors, the intended beneficiaries of the anti-fraud provisions of
the federal securities laws, can sue for misconduct during tender offers.
B. Prohibited Tender Offer Practices
Rule 10b-5 70 and section 14(e)7 1 are anti-fraud provisions preventing
67 Id. at 250. The Crane court stated that the deterrent value of a possible suit by a
defeated tender offeror is speculative since there already exists a potential class of plaintiffs,
the investors, who are available to enforce the prohibitions of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.
Moreover, implying a cause of action in favor of Crane arguably could prejudice some inves-
tors by deterring tender offers because of the possibility of a massive damage claim against
the tender offeror. Id.
" Id. at 251. Injunctive relief is a more efficient remedy for securities violations than
damages because an injunction prevents the harm from ever occurring. In contrast, a suit for
damages occurs only after the illegal conduct causes harm. A suit for damages thus seeks to
undo harm that has already taken place. The court in Crane noted that Crane sought in-
junctive relief in 1968 to prevent the consummation of the merger. Upon denial of the in-
junction, Crane relied exclusively on the possibility of retrospective relief in a suit for dam-
ages. The Second Circuit stated that Crane had to bear the consequences of this choice of
litigation strategy. Id.
69 Id. The Crane court, in denying standing to Crane upon § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
emphasized that § 14(e) did not confer important, new rights on a tender offeror. Id.; see
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 30. Crane held that the Supreme Court's char-
acterizing a tender offeror's suit for damages as a new right in discussing § 14(e) implied
that no such cause of action existed under prior federal law, which included § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 603 F.2d at 251.
70 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979); see note 16 supra.
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manipulation and deception with respect to securities transactions.
Neither provision, however, defines what constitutes a manipulative or
deceptive practice. Therefore, the courts must determine the practices
prohibited by Rule 10b-5 and section 14(e).
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co. 72 examined the rela-
tionship between a breach of a fiduciary duty7" and a violation of Rule
10b-5 to determine whether a breach of such a duty is actionable under
Rule 10b-5. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company (Mutual) began ac-
quiring shares of United Benefit Life Insurance Company (United) in
1951. 7" Thereafter, lutual and various outside experts conducted studies
to evaluate United's stock.78 The Mutual Investment Committee ap-
pointed a special subcommittee to oversee the continued acquisition of
United stock.76 At each annual meeting from 1970 through 1977, the Mu-
tual policyholders authorized the policyholders investment-executive
committee to implement a program to acquire the shares of United and
other subsidiaries.
77
During the initial stages of Mutual's acquisition program, Mutual allo-
cated joint operating expenses between the two companies according to a
formula devised by Arthur Andersen & Co.78 The Andersen formula allo-
cated expenses according to the relative benefits derived by each com-
pany, except for advertising expenses which were borne by Mutual.7 9 Mu-
tual adopted a new plan in 1965 under which Mutual and United equally
shared agency management expenses.8 0 Further changes in the allocation
71 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); see note 15 supra.
71 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979). See text accompanying notes 19-44 supra.
73 A fiduciary relationship exists between the controlling factions of a corporation and
the corporation's minority stockholders. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 137
(1972). Those owing a fiduciary duty must not exercise their corporate control in such a way
as to promote personal interests to the detriment of the interests of the corporation and
minority stockholders. Id.
74 465 F. Supp. at 1354. Mutual and United are both insurance companies incorporated
and headquartered in Nebraska. Id. at 1353. United is a stockholder-owned life insurance
company. Id. Mutual is a mutual legal reserve company engaged primarily in selling and
underwriting health and accident insurance. Id. The two companies were jointly operated
but not jointly owned. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) ad-
vised Mutual in 1949 to acquire all outstanding shares of United to alleviate the continuing
conflict of interest risk caused by joint operation. Id. In 1951, Mutual sought a declaratory
judgment from a Nebraska state court as to the legality of the proposed purchase of United
shares. The legality of such a transaction was upheld provided that Mutual invested no
more than 35% of its surplus in United stock. Id. at 1354.
75 Id.
76 Id. Mutual continually made open-market purchases of United stock during the 26
years preceding the 1977 tender offer. Id. Beginning in 1968, Mutual made these purchases
through an intermediary because of fear that disclosure of the purchasing efforts might raise
the price of United stock. Id.
77Id.
7S Id. at 1354-55.
7 Id. at 1355.
80 Id.
1980]
940 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
formula resulted in United paying forty-nine percent of the advertising
expenses in 1975, and incurring substantial portions of the start-up ex-
penses of three new Mutual subsidiaries.8 1.
After Mutual made a tender offer for United shares in October 1977,82
shareholders of United filed suit alleging that Mutual, through its acquisi-
tion plan, attempted to downplay United's value, thereby depressing
United's stock price to facilitate Mutual's takeover.8 " The elements of the
alleged scheme to depress United's stock price included improper alloca-
tion of joint expenses to United, a low dividend policy for United, use of
unreasonably conservative accounting procedures in the preparation of
United's financial reports, and failure to disclose these procedures as well
as the true value of United's assets." Plaintiffs claimed that this scheme
constituted manipulation and misrepresentation prohibited by section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 85
The Hundahl court first examined the plaintiff's claims to determine
whether the alleged conduct on the part of Mutual constituted manipula-
tion" under Rule 10b-5.8 7 The Hundahl plaintiffs argued that any breach
81 Id.
See text accompanying note 21 supra.
8 465 F. Supp. at 1354.
8 Id.
" Id. Plaintiffs in Hundahl also alleged certain violations of § 14(e). Id. at 1355-56.
After holding that the non-tendering shareholders had standing to assert a § 14(e) claim, see
text accompanying notes 19-44 supra, the Hundahl court did not reach the merits of the §
14(e) claim due to the holding on the reliance issue. See text accompanying notes 176-89
infra.
" Manipulation is a term of art that refers generally to practices intended to mislead
investors by artificially affecting market activity. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 476 (1977); note 91 infra.
87 465 F. Supp. at 1359-63. Before reaching the merits of plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5 claims,
the Hundahl court faced the question of whether one of the plaintiffs, who had neither
purchased nor sold securities, had standing to seek injunctive relief under Rule 10o-5. The
court held that such standing exists. Id. at 1357.
The Supreme Court strictly construed the purchaser-seller requirement in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, 749 (1975), which involved a suit for
money damages. See note 41 supra. Hundahl held that the Blue Chip reasoning does not
preclude a Rule 10b-5 suit by a non-purchaser or non-seller for injunctive relief. See 465 F.
Supp. at 1358-59. The Hundahl court first noted that one who neither purchases nor sells a
security seeks a conjectural and speculative monetary award because there is no precise
number of shares on which to calculate a damage award. Tabulation of the precise number
of shares involved is not necessary when injunctive relief is sought because there is no need
to calculate any damage award. Id. at 1358. Moreover, the proof in a damage suit involving
one who neither purchases nor sells securities rests largely on uncorroborated testimony. A
plaintiff in such suit must prove what he would have done had the defendant not engaged in
the allegedly unlawful conduct. Plaintiff's testimony would amount to little more than spec-
ulation. In a suit for injunctive relief, however, a plaintiff must prove a specific injury. A suit
for injunctive relief will thus not rest on wholly subjective evidence. Id.
Finally, there is no danger of creating an infinite class of potential plaintiffs by allowing
a suit by a non-purchaser or non-seller for injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5. Past purchas-
ers of United stock who are presently minority shareholders are easily identified. Hence, the
possibility of vexatious litigation pursued for settlement value alone is minimized. Id. at
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of fiduciary duty coupled with an intent to affect market prices consti-
tutes manipulation."s The defendants"9 countered that intent alone is not
enough and that only activities in the marketplace can constitute manip-
ulation under Rule 10b-5.90 Based largely on the Supreme Court's holding
in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,92 the Hundahl court found for the
defendants and dismissed the Rule 10b-5 claims of manipulation.
92
The Hundahl court began its analysis by examining the common law
decisions involving manipulation." Courts, before the enactment of the
federal securities laws, held that the securities market requires market
freedom to function properly and that any scheme that interferes with
that free market mechanism is manipulative. These manipulative
schemes, according to the Hundahl court, invariably involved market-
place transactions that artificially affected the market price of a listed
stock.9 5 The court then held that the '34 Act did not expand the common
law view of manipulation." In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court cited section
9 of the '34 Act as indicative of the type of activities encompassed under
the term "manipulation." 7 Section 9 prohibits "manipulation of security
prices" by proscribing conduct involving marketplace activity that artifi-
1358-59; accord, Fuchs v. Swanton Corp., M.P.C. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,133 at 96,249-50 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1979). But see Initio, Inc. v. Hesse, 474 F. Supp. 312,
320 (D. Del. 1979); Krueger v. Kirkpatrick, 466 F. Supp. 800, 805-06 (D. Neb. 1979).
"465 F. Supp. at 1359.
8, The defendants in Mutual included Mutual, the chief executive officer and chairman
of the board of directors of both Mutual and United, the president and chief operating
officer of Mutual, the senior executive vice president of Mutual and United, United (for
derivative purposes only), and the vice-chairman of Mutual's board of directors. Id. at 1353.
0 Id. at 1359.
91 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Santa Fe Industries, Inc. (Santa Fe) owned 95% of the stock of
Kirby Lumber Corp. (Kirby). Id. at 465. Santa Fe could thus take advantage of Delaware's
"short-form merger" statute which allows a parent corporation, owning at least 90% of the
stock of a subsidiary, to merge with that subsidiary upon approval by the parent's board of
directors. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975). The statute does not require advance notice to
or approval of minority stockholders with respect to the merger. Id. Minority shareholders
of Kirby sued alleging that the offered price for their shares in the merger was inadequate,
that Santa Fe knew that the appraised value of Kirby stock was fraudulent, and that Santa
Fe offered a premium over the appraised value to convey a false impression of generosity.
430 U.S. at 467. Plaintiffs claimed that this conduct violated Rule 10b-5. Id. at 467-68. The
Supreme Court disagreed holding that the alleged conduct did not constitute manipulation
or deception within the meaning of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 474.
,2 465 F. Supp. at 1359-63.
93 Id. at 1360-61.
" See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd on other
grounds, 79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. McCarthy v. United States, 296 U.S.
650 (1935) (one reading a price quotation on a stock exchange is justified in believing that
quoted price is result of series of sales between parties dealing at arms length in free and
open market). See also Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931); Sampson v.
Shaw, 101 Mass. 145 (1809).
"435 F. Supp. at 1360-61.
"Id. at 1361.
97 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 476.
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cially affects the price of a stock.98 Since all the manipulative devices pro-
hibited by section 9 give the false impression that market activity is oc-
curring due to supply and demand forces, Hundahl held that Rule 10b-5
prohibits the same type of manipulative conduct."9 This construction of
the scope of Rule 10b-5 excludes conduct not occurring in the
marketplace.
In holding that the defendants' activities did not amount to manipula-
tion, the Hundahl court also was sensitive to several policy considera-
tions.100 Recent Supreme Court decisions limit the scope of federal securi-
ties law so not to infringe on the province of state courts.1 10  The
plaintiffs' claim in Hundahl was basically a state law claim for breach of a
fiduciary duty. 02 Allowing the Hundahl plaintiffs to bring this type of
claim could result in a boundless class of plaintiffs who would couple alle-
gations of corporate unfairness and intentional manipulation of the mar-
ket price of a stock to gain access to federal court.103
In examining the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, the common
law decisions involving securities manipulation, the legislative history of
the '34 Act, and certain policy considerations, the HundahI court formu-
lated a definition of manipulation that includes only practices in the mar-
ketplace which create the false impression that certain market activity is
ocurring and which tamper with the price of a stock. 0 4 The defendants in
Hundahl engaged in no market activity. At most, the Hundahl defen-
dants only had an intent to manipulate the market price. Such manipula-
tive intent is merely a breach of a fiduciary duty and is not the type of
conduct encompassed by the Rule 10b-5 definition of manipulation.
0 5
The Hundahl court stated that the narrow definition of manipulation
under Rule 10b-5 is not overly restrictive because few attempts to affect
the market price of stock artificially could succeed without being actiona-
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976). Specifically, § 9 prevents such practices as rigged prices,
fictitious or "wash" sales, and matched orders for the purpose of creating an inaccurate
picture of market activity. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(6), (1) (1976).
" 435 F. Supp. at 1361-62. The Hundahl court did not address whether the scope of §
10b and the scope of § 9 are coextensive. Id. at 1361. The court did hold that the legislative
history of the '34 Act supports the conclusion that § 9 and Rule 10b-5 proscribe the same
type of activity. Id. at 1361-62. See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
100 435 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
1*1 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (mere breach of
fiduciary duty not violation of Rule 10b-5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42
(1977) (defeated tender offeror lacks standing to sue under § 14(e)); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (strict construction of Rule 10b-5's purchaser-
seller requirement).
'0 435 F. Supp. at 1362. See note 73 supra.
103 Id. at 1362-63.
'04 Id. at 1360.
1"I See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 477 (mere corporate mismanagement
not within prohibitions of Rule 10b-5). See generally Sherrard, Federal Judicial and Regu-
latory Responses to Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 35 WASH. & Lmn L. REv. 695, 696-97
(1978); Note, Section 10(b)-The Manipulation and Deception Requirement, 52 IND. L.
REV. 641, 644 (1978).
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ble as deception under Rule 10b-5. 111 Rule 10b-5 imposes an affirmative
duty to disclose material facts. 07 Once material facts are disclosed, how-
ever, no duty exists to explain the significance of the information.108 A
plaintiff cannot "bootstrap" his way into federal court by alleging state
law violations 09 and then claiming that the defendant failed to disclose
violations of state law.110
The majority of the Hundahl plaintiffs' claims of deception were not
actionable1 because the plaintiffs alleged a failure to explain disclosed
facts.11 2 The only arguable deceptive act cognizable under federal law was
the defendants' failure to disclose that a dividend restriction, imple-
mented over ten years earlier but still in effect, was no longer valid.113
Moreover, all the claims of deception failed to amount to actionable con-
duct under Rule 10b-5.114 The Hundahl court rightfully recognized that
the line between mismanagement and non-disclosure is one that cannot
be drawn with precision.1 1 5 The court adhered closely to the spirit of
Santa Fe and held that when the "central thrust," of a claim arises from
corporate mismanagement, the claim is not actionable under federal
1" 435 F. Supp. at 1362.
107 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979); note 16 supra.
108 435 F.Supp. at 1364; see note 110 infra.
0 The state law violations which traditionally form the basis of the "bootstrap" argu-
ment are violations of fiduciary duties. See note 73 supra.
110 435 F. Supp. at 1364; see Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 1978)
(defendants have no duty to characterize motivation for their conduct); Popkin v. Bishop,
464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendants have no duty to comment on wisdom or
fairness of particular conduct because Rule 10b-5 imposes a duty to disclose and inform
rather than to pass judgment); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(even under narrowest reading of Santa Fe, deception requires allegation of more than mere
failure to disclose the unfairness of a transaction); Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F.
Supp. 190, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (investors must be completely informed as to material mat-
ters but no requirement that adequately disclosed information be "spoonfed"); Stedman v.
Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (securities laws were never meant to require
psychoanalysis or self-analysis); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Md.
1965) (improper purpose and failure to disclose that purpose does not violate Rule 10b-5).
" 435 F. Supp. at 1365. The plaintiffs in Hundahl alleged several instances of decep-
tion. These allegations included failure to disclose a breach of fiduciary duty, to reveal mis-
management, to state that the allocation of expenses was unfair to United, to disclose the
concealment of United's true profitability, and to state that the financial reports of United
did not reflect the company's true value. Id. at 1365-66. The court held none of these claims
actionable under Rule 10b-5 since the defendants did not conceal facts. Id. at 1364-65. The
defendants merely failed to label and pass judgment on disclosed information. Id.
112 Id.
MS A dividend restriction, stemming from a recommendation of the NAIC, was in effect
since 1954-55. Defendants disclosed the restriction but not the fact that the NAIC would lift
the restriction upon request. Id. at 1365. Although the Hundahl court recognized that the
claim was analogous to one for mismanagement for failure to request the lifting of the re-
striction, the court stated that a question of fact existed as to whether the claim is cogniza-
ble under Rule 10b-5. Id. Therefore, the court did not dismiss this claim. Id.
1, 435 F. Supp. at 1365.
11 Id. at 1364.
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law.116
The rule announced by the Hundahl court is not difficult concep-
tually. Claims based on breaches of fiduciary duty are not within the
scope of the federal securities laws. A precise line between mismanage-
ment and non-disclosure, however, cannot be drawn. The practical result
is that courts possess the flexibility to take an expansive or restrictive
view of federal securities law. The Hundahl approach is an example of a
fairly strict reading of the federal law.'1 ' Lewis v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.11
exemplifies the more liberal approach to the scope of federal securities
law.
On January 8, 1979, American Express Company (AMEXCO) publicly
proposed a friendly business combination to McGraw-Hill, Inc. (McGraw-
Hill).119 The directors of McGraw-Hill rejected the proposed offer.
1 20
Shareholders of McGraw-Hill then sued the McGraw-Hill directors for
violations of section 14(e). 12' Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants announced that AMEXCO's proposed offer price was inade-
quate knowing that the proposal was fair, unlawfully publicly challenged
the integrity of AMEXCO and the legality of the proposed tender offer,
published a letter that McGraw-Hill sent AMEXCO characterizing the
proposed tender offer as "reckless," "illegal," and "improper," and failed
to disclose that McGraw-Hill previously told AMEXCO that McGraw-
Hill considered AMEXCO to be a desirable merger partner.122 The plain-
tiffs thus argued that the tender offer would have been successful but for
defendants' conduct which allegedly violated statutory and common law
fiduciary duties. 28
Before deciding whether the plaintiffs' allegations were actionable
under section 14(e), the Lewis court held that section 14(e) prevents ma-
nipulative and deceptive practices when an offeror merely "proposes" a
tender offer.12 4 The court emphasized that section 14(e) operates "in con-
nection with any tender offer."125 Conduct prior to the actual making of a
tender offer can have as pervasive an influence on the target shareholders
116 Id. at 1365-66.
1 The Hundahl court justified its restrictive view of the federal securities law by rely-
ing on Supreme Court decisions which indicate that the Court is restricting the scope of
these laws. See id. at 1362-63; see, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(actionable conduct); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (standing under §
14(e)). Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (standing under Rule
10b-5).
118 [Current] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 97,195 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1979).
'1' Id. at 96,567. The basis of the friendly business combination proposed by American
Express Company (AMEXCO) was AMEXCO's ownership of 49 per cent of the outstanding
securities of McGraw-Hill. Id.
120 Id.
2 Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976); note 15 supra.
11 [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 at 96,567, 96,569.
1.3 Id. at 96,567.
.24 Id. at 96,568.
115 Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976); note 15 supra.
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as conduct after the formal announcement of the tender offer. 2 6 If sec-
tion 14(e) does not apply to conduct prior to the formal announcement of
a tender offer, a party could make omissions and misstatements until the
formal offer without fear of legal reprise. 27 These omissions and misstate-
ments easily could influence the future decision of target stockholders on
whether to tender their shares.128 Hence, once a public announcement of
a proposed tender offer establishes a clear and definite intent to make a
tender offer, the prohibitions of section 14(e) apply. 29 The Lewis court's
holding that section 14(e) covers proposed tender offers furthers the con-
gressional intent of protecting the target shareholder who ultimately must
decide whether or not to tender.2 0
Once the Lewis court decided that section 14(e) applies to proposed
tender offers, the court addressed the alleged violation of that section.
The Lewis defendants argued that the plaintiffs simply alleged breaches
of corporate fiduciary duty which do not constitute deception under sec-
tion 14(e) in light of Santa Fe.15' The Lewis court responded that Santa
Fe does not ban all claims based on breaches of state law fiduciary duty
under section 14(e).132 According to the court, Santa Fe requires only an
allegation of non-disclosure or misleading disclosure.' 33 The court held
that while plaintiffs' allegations involved breaches of fiduciary duties, the
allegations also involved non-disclosure and misleading disclosure, and
thus stated a cause of action for deception under section 14(e).1"
Although seemingly contradictory, the Hundahl and Lewis decisions
are distinguishable. Unlike the Lewis plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in Hundahl
did not allege statements or omissions designed to mislead the target cor-
poration's shareholders."s5 Both cases, however, basically involved claims
126 [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 at 96,568 (quoting Applied Digital Data
Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
127 Id.
22 Id.
129 [Current] FED. S.c. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 at 96,568. See also Reserve Management
Corp. v. Anchor Daily Income Fund, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 597, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (§ 14(e)
applies when there is public announcement of clear and definite intent to make tender of-
fer); Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1153-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (failure to apply § 14(e) to proposed tender offers frustrates remedial pur-
poses of statute); ARANow & EiNHORN, supra note 3, at 122-25; LIPTON & STrMEaRGER,
supra note 2, § 2.3.7; Note, 1976-1977 Securities Law Developments: Tender Offers, 34
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 945, 946-54 (1977). Cf. ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land
Trust, 378 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (court allows § 14(e) suit during proposed tender
offer period).
120 See 113 CONG. Rac. 854, 24864 (1967); note 33 supra. Lewis held that § 14(e) applies
to proposed tender offers in a suit for injunctive relief or damages. [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,195 at 96,568.
131 Id. at 96,569. See note 92 supra.
12 [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 at 96,569.
I" Id.
23 Id.; accord, Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (D.D.C.
1977).
'3 The plaintiffs in Hundahl did not allege any statements by the defendants that were
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of non-disclosure of information that a target shareholder should have in
deciding whether to tender his shares. The difference between the two
decisions rests on differing philosophies concerning the scope of the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities law."3 6 The Lewis court's broad
interpretation of the scope of section 14(e), however, is not without limits
as shown by the decision in In re Sunshine Mining Company Securities
Litigation.'3 '
On March 19, 1977, Great Western United Corporation (Great West-
ern) informed the Sunshine Mining Company (Sunshine Mining) of Great
Western's intention to make a tender offer for Sunshine Mining stock at
$16.25 a share if the Sunshine Mining board of directors approved the
offer within twenty-four hours. 38 Absent such approval, Great Western
informed Sunshine Mining that the offer would proceed, but at a lower
price. 9 The Sunshine Mining board of directors did not give their ap-
proval. ,0 Great Western made a public tender offer on March 23, 1977,
an amended offer on September 19, and a final offer on October 4.' Dur-
ing this entire period, Sunshine Mining management made no public
statements except to disclose the various developments with respect to
the tender offer. 42 Sunshine Mining's board made no recommendation
that the Sunshine Mining stockholders refrain from tendering their
shares.
4 3
Stockholders of Sunshine Mining sued Sunshine Mining's directors for
violating section 14(e).' 4 The complaint alleged that the directors of Sun-
shine Mining acted for their own selfish interests in complete disregard of
their fiduciary duties by refusing and resisting Great Western's tender
offer."4 5 Plaintiffs claimed that such action by Sunshine Mining's direc-
tors constituted deception under section 14(e).
146
misleading. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra. The Hundahl plaintiffs alleged a fail-
ure to explain adequately disclosed information. Id. In contrast, the Lewis plaintiffs alleged
statements made by the defendants which, standing alone, were blatantly misleading. See
text accompanying note 122 supra.
M The expansive reading of § 14(e) taken by the Lewis court was of little benefit to the
Lewis plaintiffs due to the court's holding on the reliance requirement. See text accompany-
ing notes 194-97 infra.




"4 Id. On March 23, 1977, Great Western filed statements with Idaho state officials and
with the SEC indicating that the tender offer was for 2,000,000 Sunshine Mining shares at
$15.75 a share. Idaho officials claimed inadequacies in the filing and took steps to prevent
the tender offer. Great Western fied suit challenging the constitutionality of the Idaho filing
statute. Id. Great Western's suit resulted in an injunction preventing the State of Idaho








The Sunshine Mining court held that even if all the allegations were
true, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action cognizable under sec-
tion 14(e). " 7 Recognizing that the '34 Act is basically a disclosure act, the
court stated that there was no deception in the alleged facts because Sun-
shine Mining's directors disclosed all material information.14 8 Further,
there was no manipulation because Sunshine Mining engaged in no mar-
ket activity.149 Although the plaintiffs arguably stated a cause of action
under state law for breach of fiduciary duty, they failed to state a cause of
action under the federal securities laws.150
The Lewis and Sunshine Mining decisions demonstrate a consistent
philosophy regarding the federal securities laws. Lewis involved numerous
allegations of non-disclosure and misleading disclosure 51 that were suffi-
cient to state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 or section 14(e) under
the Southern District of New York's interpretation of Santa Fe.15 2 Plain-
tiffs in Sunshine Mining did not allege either non-disclosure or mislead-
ing disclosure.153 The mere allegation of breach of fiduciary duty is not
actionable under the federal securities laws even under the most expan-
sive reading of Santa Fe.1"
Unlike Lewis and Sunshine Mining, the court in In re Commonwealth
Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corporation Securities Litigation15 5 examined al-
leged conduct clearly amounting to more than a breach of fiduciary duty.
On April 18, 1975, Tesoro Petroleum Corporation (Tesoro) made a tender
offer for shares of Commonwealth Oil Refining Company (Corco).156 The
president and chief executive officer of Corco responded by publishing
two full-page letters in the Wall Street Journal, urging rejection of the
14 Id. at 96,635-36.
148 Id.
149 Id. See text accompanying notes 86-103 supra.
150 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,217 at 96,635-36. On November 20, 1979, the
SEC adopted Rule 14e-2. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16384 (Nov. 20,
1979), 531 Sac. REr. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1 (1979). Rule 14e-2 requires the target company to
publish or send or give to security holders a statement disclosing the company's position
with respect to the tender offer within ten business days after the formal tender offer. The
position statement must either recommend acceptance of the tender offer, express no opin-
ion and state that the target company will remain neutral, or state that the target company
is unable to take a position with respect to the tender offer. Further, the target company
must state reasons for its position. Id. Thus, if this rule had been in effect at the time of
Great Western's tender offer for Sunshine Mining stock, Sunshine Mining's failure to re-
spond to the tender offer would violate the federal securities laws. The Sunshine Mining
court's analysis under § 14(e), however, remains valid even in light of the adoption of Rule
14e-2.
151 See text accompanying note 122 supra.
15, See text accompanying notes 118-34 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 144-46 supra.
15 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 479-80.
151 467 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
'" Id. at 234. Tesoro's tender offer was for 5.5 million shares of Corco stock at $11.50 a
share. Id.
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tender offer. 157 Tesoro increased the tender offer price per share and
Corco's opposition to the tender offer ceased. 5 " The two companies then
issued a joint press release stating that upon completion of the tender
offer the companies would use their best efforts to develop a fair and eq-
uitable consolidation plan.15 Upon successful completion of the tender
offer, however, Corco had been, and still was, in financial trouble. 160
Tesoro suspended plans for consolidation"'6 and Corco filed a petition for
voluntary bankruptcy on March 2, 1978.162
Past and present stockholders of Corco sued alleging violations of sec-
tion 14(e). 6 s The plaintiffs claimed that the published letters were decep-
tive because they contained false representations made intentionally or
with reckless disregard for the truth.'6 ' The plaintiffs further claimed
that Tesoro and Corco's joint press release was deceptive because the re-
lease did not disclose an alleged agreement concerning future employ-
ment between Tesoro and the chief executive officer of Corco.16 5 Plaintiffs
also claimed that the joint press release was deceptive because the two
companies made representations about future consolidation plans when
Tesoro lacked sufficient knowledge of Corco and its financial structure to
make such representations.' The court held each of these claims action-
able under section 14(e). 6 7 The holding in Commonwealth Oil is correct
since the claims alleged material omissions and misrepresentations, con-
157 Id. The first of the letters urging rejection of the tender offer was in the April 22,
1975 Wall Street Journal. Id. The letter expressed confidence in Corco's long-term pros-
pects and stated that the tender offer failed to reflect adquately Corco's true value. Id. The
second letter, published on April 28, contained the same basic representations and added
that Corco's prospects "never looked brighter." Id.
1" Id. The price Tesoro offered for each share of Corco's stock increased from $11.50
per share to $14.25 per share. Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 234-35. Tesoro successfully completed the tender offer on June 6, 1975. Id. at
235.
1.1 Id. at 235. Tesoro issued a press release on October 22, 1976, announcing a suspen-
sion of plans for consolidation of Tesoro and Corco until Corco could demonstrate financial
viability. Id.
162 Id.
1- Id. at 235-36, 240.
1" Id. at 240.
15 Id. at 243.
1I Id.
167 Id. at 240-48. Defendants in Commonwealth Oil contended that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring claims based on § 14(e) because they were non-tendering shareholders. Id.
at 241. The court held that non-tenderors had sufficient standing. Id. at 241-43; see text
accompanying notes 15-44 supra. Defendants also contended that there could be no reliance
on the alleged misrepresentations because the plaintiff-shareholders did not tender their
shares. See note 189 infra.
The Commonwealth Oil defendants also argued immateriality as a matter of law as to
the alleged misrepresentations in the joint press release. 467 F. Supp. at 244; see text ac-
companying note 159 supra. The court disagreed and held that the alleged agreement be-
tween Tesoro and Corco's chief executive officer of the alleged unfeasibility of consolidation
could influence the reasonable investor. 467 F. Supp. at 244-45.
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duct clearly prohibited by section 14(e).118
The Commonwealth Oil plaintiffs also alleged a violation of Rule 10b-
5,169 claiming that Tesoro knew that the letters in the Wall Street Jour-
nal170 contained misstatements which Tesoro failed to correct.171 The
court held that this alleged conduct on the part of Tesoro did not violate
Rule 10b-5 because there is no liability for non-disclosure unless there is
some duty to disclose, and one party to a tender offer has no duty to
correct misstatements by another party.172 Moreover, Tesoro was unaware
of the falsity of the statements when the Wall Street Journal published
the letters.
7 3
Commonwealth Oil's holding that Tesoro did not violate Rule 10b-5
by failing to correct the misstatements in the letters in the Wall Street
Journal probably is correct. A party making a misleading misrepresenta-
tion should not be able to shift liability to another party because the lat-
ter had the opportunity to correct the misrepresentation several months
after publication and failed to do so. Rule 10b-5 imposes no duty to cor-
rect misstatements on one who is neither the source nor the subject of the
misstatement nor is aware of the misstatement when made.
174
A review of the Hundahl, Lewis, Sunshine Mining, and Common-
wealth Oil decisions emphasizes the tension between federal and state
control of corporate misconduct. Hundahl illustrates a restrictive view of
the scope of federal law while Lewis, even as limited by Sunshine Mining,
represents a more expansive view of the federal securities laws. Common-
wealth Oil is the only case that clearly falls under the ambit of federal
law. Each court responds to the tension between federal and state control
by drawing fine lines between corporate mismanagement amounting to a
mere breach of fiduciary duty and conduct actionable under the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The difficulty for the prac-
ticing attorney, however, lies in the fact that the lines between state and
federal authority are not drawn in a consistent and predictable manner.
C. Reliance Requirement for a Non-Tendering Shareholder
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Insurance' Co. 76 and Lewis v. Mc-
Graw-Hill176 upheld the standing of non-tendering shareholders to bring
'" See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); note 15 supra.
I' 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979); see note 16 supra.
,, See text acompanying note 157 supra.
17 467 F. Supp. at 239.
172 Id. at 239-40; accord, Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969) (company may choose to correct another's misstatements in
press but nothing in federal securities law so requires).
173 467 F. Supp. at 240.
274 Id.
17 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979); see text accompanying notes 21-44, 72-116
supra.
1I [Current] Fam. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1979); see text ac-
companying notes 118-34 supra.
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a private cause of action under section 14(e). 17 The defendants in each
case then argued that the plaintiff-shareholders did not rely on a material
omission or misrepresentation because the plaintiffs did not tender their
shares.1 7 8 The alleged fraudulent conduct arguably could not be the cause
of any injury because the plaintiffs did not tender their shares and thus
were not fraudulently deprived of the value of their investment.
17 9
The Hundahl court stated that the purpose of the Williams Act is to
insure full disclosure of all information to shareholders who must decide
whether to accept a tender offer. 8 0 Thus, according to the court, the Wil-
liams Act protects shareholders who are misled by material omissions or
misrepresentations in the course of a tender offer.' 8s The plaintiffs in
Hundahl were aware that the representations made by Mutual of Omaha
Life Insurance Company"s2 were untrue and thus were not misled into
tendering their shares.'8 s Since they were not misled, the plaintiffs were
not the type of victims of non-disclosure that the Williams Act protects
and, therefore, lacked standing'8 under section 14(e). 8 5
The Hundahl decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under section
171 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); note 15 supra. See generally text accompanying notes
21-44 supra.
171 See 465 F. Supp. at 1368-70; [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 at 96,570.
179 Id.
180 465 F. Supp. at 1369.
181 Id.
"I See text accompanying note 84 supra.
18 465 F. Supp. at 1369.
18 The Hundahl court stated that the plaintiffs lacked "standing" to sue because they
were not misled by the allegedly fraudulent representations. Id. Such terminology is confus-
ing since the court previously extended standing to the same plaintiffs as non-tendering
shareholders. Id. at 1366-68. Perhaps the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit but the court
dismissed their claims because the plaintiffs were unable to show injury recoverable under
the Williams Act.
"1 465 F. Supp. at 1369. The Hundahl court refused to state what the holding would be
had the plaintiffs' reliance been at least an objective possibility. Id. The court stated,
though, that a person who clearly did not rely on alleged misstatements could not recover.
Id.; see St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d
1040, 1049 (8th Cir. 1977) (no recovery absent reliance).
The Hundahl court also examined the reliance issue from the vantage point of alleged
injury. 465 F. Supp. at 1369-70. The plaintiffs claimed that Mutual's misrepresentations
resulted in a successful tender offer which significantly decreased the value of the United
shares. Id. at 1369. The court responded that the Williams Act prevents direct injuries re-
sulting from the tendering or non-tendering of shares and that the plaintiffs' alleged injury
was too attenuated to be recoverable under § 14(e). Id. at 1370. The court further stated
that the measure of damage under § 14(e) is the difference between the offered price for the
shares and their genuine value. Id. at 1369. Diminution in market value of a stock, the
plaintiffs' alleged injury, is thus not part of the damage formula under § 14(e). Id. at 1369-
70.
The Hundahl court further stated that allowing a recovery by non-tendering plaintiffs
was unnecessary to effectuate the congressional goals of the Williams Act. Id. at 1370.
Shareholders who actually relied on the misrepresentations could bring suit. Id. Hence, an




14(e) is unsound. The approach taken by the Hundahl court indicates
that a non-tendering shareholder, claiming misrepresentation by a tender
offeror, must rely on the misrepresentation in deciding not to tender. A
tender offeror's representations, however, will be made with the intent of
inducing the shareholder to tender.186 In effect, the Hundahl holding im-
plies a purchaser-seller requirement under section 14(e). 187 This decision
is incorrect because Congress specifically omitted such a requirement in
enacting section 14(e) to give standing to those who do not qualify under
Rule 10b-5.1 81 The decision in Hundahl makes the distinction between
section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 meaningless.189
Other courts have not taken the restrictive view of reliance adhered to
by the Hundahl court. The court in McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, Inc.190
held that a non-tendering shareholder can have the value of his holdings
seriously impaired by misrepresentations made by the tender offeror.191
To require personal reliance by the non-tendering shareholder, according
to the McCloskey court, implies a section 14(e) purchaser-seller require-
ment that Congress intended to eliminate.19 2 The court stated that the
reliance of those shareholders who do tender on a material misrepresenta-
tion is sufficient causation for a non-tendering shareholder.198 The Mc-
Closkey analysis is correct and the refusal of the Hundahl court to adopt
the McCloskey rationale results in a non-tendering shareholder lacking a
remedy for injury caused by a tender offeror's misrepresentation.
In contrast to Hundahl, the refusal of the court in Lewis v. McGraw-
Hill194 to adopt a liberal reliance requirement is consistent with the Wil-
liams Act. Determining that section 14(e) applies when a tender offeror
announces a clear and definite intent to make a tender offer, the Lewis
court then held that since no tender offer was ever made, the plaintiffs
' But see In re Commonwealth Oil]Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litigation, 467 F.
Supp. at 243-44 (alleged misrepresentation by tender offeror caused shareholders not to
tender).
187 See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
I" See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 38; text accompanying notes 38-41
supra.
189 The restrictive view of reliance taken by the Hundahl court arguably will be availa-
ble in a § 14(e) claim against the target company's management. Any misrepresentations by
such a defendant will be made to induce a target shareholder not to tender. A shareholder
could thus use the Hundahl analysis and argue reliance on the misrepresentation in decid-
ing not to tender. See In re Commonwealth OilV]esoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litigation, 467
F. Supp. at 243 (reliance on target management's alleged misrepresentations caused non-
tender).
190 391 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
191 Id. at 1282. The injury suffered by non-tendering shareholders is a decline in the
market value of retained stock. 465 F. Supp. at 1349; see Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,269 at 92,747 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977)
(where deception adversely affects market for a stock, plaintiff's personal reliance on mis-
statements or omissions may be irrelevant in establishing causation).
192 391 F. Supp. at 1282.
193 Id.
194 [Current] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1979).
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failed to rely to their detriment on any alleged misrepresentations.19 5 The
plaintiffs were thus never in a position to decide whether to tender.196
Presumably, if there is an actual tender offer, the Lewis rationale allows
misstatements made during the pre-tender offer period to be actionable
under section 14(e).
Support for the Lewis decision lies in the fact that Congress enacted
section 14(e) for the protection of target shareholders during a tender of-
fer. 19' Without a tender offer the harm section 14(e) seeks to prevent can-
not occur. A target shareholder cannot rely on alleged misrepresentations
unless the shareholder has the opportunity to decide whether to tender.
Without such an opportunity, section 14(e) is inapplicable.
The court decisions of this past year have been less than adequate in
defining prohibited tender offer practices. The virtual agreement to ex-
tend standing to sue to the non-tendering shareholder is shadowed by the
fact that a court may hold that a non-tenderor has not relied on any mis-
representation. Moreover, the scope of the federal securities laws is not
defined with any precision so that actionable conduct is not identifiable
absent an examination of the philosophy of the relevant court with re-
spect to the proper balance between federal and state control of corporate
activity.
W. JEFFERY EDWARDS
See text accompanying notes 124-30 supra.
[Current] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,195 at 96,570. The Lewis plaintiffs argued
that there would have been a successful tender offer but for the target management's mis-
representations. Id. Plaintiffs' argument was thus not a claim of reliance on the part of any
target shareholder, but merely a claim that the defendants' conduct disrupted the tender
offer. This conduct is not actionable under § 14(e). See Rediker v. Geon Indus., Inc., 464 F.
Supp. 73, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (target management's misdeeds may have caused cancellation
of tender offer, but claimed injury resulted from cancellation and not from shareholders'
reliance on alleged misrepresentations).
I" See text accompanying note 33 supra.
[Vol. XXXVII
